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Soft Power and Military Aid

Great (Soft) Power Competition:
US and Chinese Efforts in Global Health Engagement
Michael W. Wissemann
ABSTR ACT: Global health engagement, an underutilized strateg y
rooted in the strengths of soft power persuasion, can lead to more
military-to-military cooperation training, help establish relationships that
can be relied on when crises develop, stabilize fragile states, and deny violent
extremist organizations space for recruiting and operations. Examining
Chinese efforts worldwide to curry favor and influence and the challenges
posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, this article shows health as a medium is a
very compelling and advantageous whole-of-government approach to national
security policy concerns.

T

Introduction

he answers to achieving many of a strategic leader’s objectives may lay in
the use of soft power. “Soft power” was first coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. in the
1990s. Nye’s definition of soft power distinguished itself from hard power
by using “attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment.”1 The
premise is that forging relationships with nations and key influential individuals
who have a like-minded view of a liberal world order will produce relationships
more inclined to stand the test of time. Conversely, relationships built upon fear
and the effects of coercive power are more likely to result in resentment and
crumble when stressed.
Global health engagement (GHE), sometimes referred to as medical diplomacy
or strategic health diplomacy, is a soft power strategy used by both China and
the United States. It is a natural derivative of soft power, focused on providing
a resource (health care) that many consider a human right. Countries that
use GHE effectively may be left with a marked advantage, especially in today’s
volatile, unpredictable, complex, and adaptive operating environment. While the
use of GHE cannot unilaterally halt some of the actions of revisionist powers or
violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in these environments, the process can
help stem the rising tide and slow revisionist rise.
Extremist powers and VEOs employ gray zone strategies to erode American
influence worldwide. These methods fall below the threshold for traditional armed
1. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “China’s Soft Power Deficit,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2012, https://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424052702304451104577389923098678842.

66

Parameters 51(3) Autumn 2021

conflict. Some gray zone strategies include “disruption of order, political subversion
of government or nongovernmental organizations, psychological operations,
abuse of legal processes and financial corruption.”2 Not a new concept, this version
is a reincarnation of Sun Tzu’s famous adage that, “To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill.”3 Sun Tzu goes on to say that to “capture his cities
without assaulting them and overthrowing his state without protracted operations”
is key.4 Not surprisingly, China is following the playbook of their greatest military
theorist. While a high-intensity conflict with a near peer remains a distant,
but catastrophic, possibility, subduing the enemy without the need for conflict could
prove far more effective, both financially and militarily. As the world witnesses
the erosion of social norms, grows tired of the international political banter,
and continues to toil with the COVID-19 pandemic, the environment is ripe
to inspire allies and potential partners to follow the America’s lead through
high-visibility, cooperative, medical partnerships.
The foundational basis for GHE is established in numerous national policies.
President Biden’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance:
Renewing America’s Advantages mentions “health” 23 times.5 He encourages
cooperation with the United Nations and European Union through the
Global Health Security Agenda and states as one of his three pillars the need
to “reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the
world.”6 Meanwhile, the latest available National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2018:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, a remnant of President
Trump’s tenure, also extensively discusses “Strengthen[ing] Alliances and
Attract[ing] New Partners.”7 Three key components of this objective are an
effort to grow alliances in the US Indo-Pacific Command, strengthen NATO
alliances to deter Russian aggression, and to support partner countries in
Africa to minimize the threat from terrorism. Diplomacy in the form of
incentives for allies through GHE, subject-matter- expert exchanges (SMEE),
and joint training exercises can sway host nation opinion and secure US influence.

US Efforts
Recently, the US military has provided medical assistance globally,
without regard for hemisphere, country, or creed. These efforts began with
2. Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges,” Prism 7,
no. 4 (2018): 36.
3. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.
4. Tzu, Art of War, 79.
5. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance: Renewing America’s Advantages (Washington,
DC: White House, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
6. Biden, Renewing America’s Advantages, 10.
7. Department of Defense (DoD), Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: DoD, 2018), 10, https://dod
.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

Soft Power and Military Aid

Wissemann 67

the construction of the Panama Canal which led to research and vaccines for
malaria and yellow fever, work that continues today through the Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research. The Department of Defense’s reputation as a world leader in
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is well earned, with medical care
being a key tenant of that mechanism. The codification to do so is provided in
Joint Publication ( JP) 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, which provides the
imperative “to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” in
areas outside of the United States.8 Furthermore, Department of Defense Instruction
(DoDI) 6000.16, Military Health for Stability Operations, defines medical stability
operations as a fundamental competency and something the military health system
must be prepared to execute across the continuum of operations, up to helping
reconstitute a host nation health-care system, if necessary.9
In 2004, on the receding tides of the world’s most deadly tsunami, the
USNS Mercy arrived in Indonesia and began a humanitarian assistance medical
presence that would last for five months.10 Staffed by limited military medical
personnel and over 200 staff from the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Project
HOPE, the endeavor showcased America’s ability to cooperate and the country’s
willingness to care in desperate times.11 In Rear Admiral William McDaniel’s
words, “The ship sells itself. . . . Virtually everyone who visited Mercy became an ally in
our efforts.”12
The following year, the United States deployed military medical assistance
professionals to Pakistan to help the country in the aftermath of a 7.6-magnitude
earthquake. The 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital arrived from Germany
at the epicenter within three weeks, along with a medical battalion from the
3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. During their time in country, the unit cared
for over 14,000 patients.13 In the end, the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
donated the hospital tents and medical equipment to the Pakistani government,
certainly adding to the partnership of a key strategic ally needed to blunt the
influence of regional VEO.14

8. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Publication (JP) 3-29 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2019), viii, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_29.pdf.
9. DoD, Military Health for Stability Operations, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6000.16 (Washington, DC: DoD,
2010), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/i6000_16.pdf.
10. PowerPoint Briefing, USNS Mercy Commanding Officer’s Brief, August 27, 2018, https://health.mil
/Reference-Center/Presentations/2018/08/27/USNS-Mercy.
11. James B. Peake, “The Project HOPE and USNS Mercy Tsunami ‘Experiment’,” Military Medicine 171,
no. S1 (October 2006), S27, https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/171/suppl_1/27/4577798.
12. William J. McDaniel, “Lessons Learned from Indonesia: An Outline,” Military Medicine 171, no. S1
(October 2006), S61, https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/171/suppl_1/59/4577813.
13. “When the Earth Shook: US Responds to Magnitude 7.6 Earthquake in Pakistan,” Year in Review (blog),
DoD, August, 4, 2005, https://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2006/2005yearinreview/article4.html.
14. Joshua Michaud et al., “Militaries and Global Health: Peace, Conflict, and Disaster Response,”
Lancet 393 (January 2019), 280, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330472289_Militaries_and_global
_health_peace_conflict_and_disaster_response.
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In 2010, the US military responded to the deadliest natural disaster in two
generations, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake on the island nation of the Republic
of Haiti, resulting in an estimated 300,000 deaths.15 The only hospital left
operating after the earthquake was an Argentine military field hospital; they were
quickly joined by medical teams from across the world, including the United
States, Russia, and China.16 Twenty-six countries provided everything from
supplies to field hospitals and hospital ships.17 The small nations of Qatar and
Israel established field hospitals. Again, the US Navy partnered with civilians from
an NGO, this time aboard the USNS Comfort hospital ship, and performed 843
lifesaving surgeries. Overall, the US task force performed over “1,000 surgeries [,]
and treated more than 9,000 patients.” While this intervention surely positively
impacted Haiti’s citizens’ impression of the United States by the thousands, a
lack of quantifiable data only allows us to posit conclusions. This common theme
in GHE should be rectified (see conclusions).18
US global health engagement efforts have employed both reactive and
proactive measures. Besides tsunami and earthquake-type humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief missions, one of the most recent large-scale proactive responses
to a medical crisis has been the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014–15. Named
Operation Unified Assistance, the response, at its core, showed progress toward
overcoming one of the largest stumbling blocks in providing medical aid across the
world. A common critique of foreign medical assistance, especially aid provided
by the Department of Defense, is that substituting US capabilities instead of
bolstering host-nation effectiveness increases reliance on the United States, and
in the long term, undermines the local system.19 It is easy to see how this creates
resentment from host-nation medical experts and runs counterproductive to US
strategic objectives.
To address these shortcomings, DoD involvement was “limited in scope and
duration; designed to supplement or complement Liberia’s own efforts; and
worked in support of the [US Agency for International Development] USAID.”20
15. Reginald DesRoches et al., “Overview of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake,” Earthquake Spectra 27, no. S1 (October
2011), S1–S21, https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/70042013.
16. David R. DiOrio, Operation Unified Response – Haiti Earthquake 2010 (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff
College, 2010), https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/4A_Haiti_HADR
_Case_Study_revNov10.pdf.
17. Gary Cecchine et al., The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for Army
Leaders (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2013), 56, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs
/research_reports/RR300/RR304/RAND_RR304.pdf.
18. Cecchine, U.S. Military Response, 58.
19. Michael D. Owens et al., “A Global Health Engagement Success: Applying Evidence-Based Concepts
to Create a Rapid Response Team in Angola to Combat Ebola and Other Public Health Emergencies of
International Concern,” Military Medicine 184, no. 5/6 (May/June 2019), 113, https://academic.oup.com/milmed
/article/184/5-6/113/5363849.
20. Alix Boucher, Supporting, Non-Standard Mission Role: US Operations in Liberia, 2014–2015, that Enabled
the US and UN Response to the EVD Outbreak (Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
(PKSOI), 2018), 35, https://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/2018/01/11/supporting-non-standard-mission-role-u
-s-operations-in-liberia-2014-2015-that-enabled-the-u-s-and-un-response-to-the-evd-outbreak/.
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In recent years, an effort has been made to synchronize US efforts with the host
nation’s desired end states. For example, in December 2020, US Army Africa in
coordination with the US Africa Command hosted a virtual conference between
military medical leaders in countries identified for a partnership exercise to
be held in summer 2021 and their US partner units. In addition to fostering
buy-in from partners, this synchronization ensures that whatever plan is
implemented by the United States is beneficial for the host nation, and
sustainable in the long run, given the economic and cultural constraints other
nations’ experience.
A more common example of proactive measures occurs during the use
of Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAPs), sometimes called Medical
Civilian Assistance Programs. MEDCAPs were a staple of the Vietnam era and
an effort to influence the local population by providing health care to citizens
in remote areas and bolstering the locals’ ability to do so independently.21
MEDCAP II was designed to be an improvement but unknowingly supplanted
host-nation capabilities during counterinsurgency operations. People are the
center of gravity on which insurgency or counterinsurgency thrive.22 At times,
MEDCAPs are used to shape the operational environment, targeting specific
locations and populations or assisting in information operations. Lieutenant
Colonel Bradley Tibbetts was responsible for delivering MEDCAPs in Kosovo
in 2001–2. He shared:
A lot was about passive intelligence gathering. The more you know
the area and the people, the more they would tell you and the more you
started to notice things that were out of place. We never went out with
intel collection in mind or actively sought information but it’s amazing
what they would tell you after you gave them a bottle of Motrin and a
box of Sudafed. I later learned that tips from my reports identified both
arms smuggling from Macedonia and human trafficking.23

The aim of famed counterinsurgency theorist David Galula’s first law of
counterinsurgency is to gain the support of the people.24 MEDCAPs, such
as those conducted in Kosovo, and more broadly GHE, directly contribute
to this aim by allowing the military to gain support and connect with the
host-nation populace. Additionally, Galula’s fourth law states that zone by
zone, the counterinsurgent must clear the enemy and strengthen infrastructure
21. “Our History,” Military Health System, accessed September 4, 2019, https://www.health.mil/Military
-Health-Topics/Health-Readiness/Global-Health-Engagement/Our-History.
22. Robert J. Wilensky, “The Military Civic Action Program in Vietnam: Success or Failure?,” Military
Medicine 166, no. 9 (Sepember2001), 817.
23. Brad Tibbetts, e-mail message to author, November 7, 2019.
24. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964, Westport, CT: Praeger Security
International, 2006), 52–55.
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to help degrade insurgents. Medical exchanges and SMEE support this
by empowering host-nation medical assets and creating capacity and
medical infrastructure, giving potential insurgent groups less of a foothold in
struggling countries.
Additionally, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research plays a role in
being proactive and exporting US influence abroad. With a tangible research lab
presence in the country of Georgia, Kenya, Peru, and Thailand, as well as partner
and field sites in over 40 additional countries, the US armed forces conduct
research with host-nation partners on a myriad of endemic diseases.25 These
medical research labs do far more than just research and health protection for
US troops. They are part of US branding abroad. “In Peru, Kenya, Egypt,
Thailand and Cambodia,” the host nations have assigned the US facilities
high-visibility partner organizations from their own government, viewing the
US labs as “national assets.”26 These partnerships also serve as a symbol of hope
and support for many countries. Peru sits next to Colombia, which struggles with
narcoterrorism. Likewise, Kenya borders Somalia, which has difficulty providing
basic social needs for its population and lacks effective governance. Many of
the associated field sites for the labs are in or near fragile states. The US
partnership helps fill a void that another country or nefarious forces could exploit.
America, too, has demonstrated a large medical commitment to Africa
over the last 18 years. While the venture is State Department led, the result of
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), established by
President Bush in 2003 and renewed twice since, is a resounding success in GHE.
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a PEPFAR program, compared with those
countries that do not have the program, demonstrated three times the growth
in UN human development index scores.27 They also showed a significant
increase in opinion of the United States and a 40 percent reduction in political
instability and violence. These effects are tied directly to the aid provided to
7.7 million Africans, through antiretroviral treatments. In Kenya, Nigeria,
and South Africa, the United States is viewed favorably in each country: 70
percent, 62 percent, and 57 percent, respectively.28

25. James B. Peake et al., The Defense Department’s Enduring Contributions to Global Health: The Future
of the US Army and Navy Overseas Medical Research Laboratories (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic &
International Studies (CSIS), 2011), vii.
26. Peake, Enduring Contributions, 6.
27. Tom Daschle and Bill Frist, The Case for Strategic Health Diplomacy: A Study of PEPFAR (Washington, DC:
Bipartisan Policy Center, 2015), 15, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/the-case-for-strategic-health-diplomacy
-a-study-of-pepfar/.
28. Kristen Bialik, “How the World Views the US and its President in 2018 in 9 Charts,” Pew Research Center,
October 9, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/09/how-the-world-views-the-u-s-and-its
-president-in-9-charts/.
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There is little debate about the utility of PEPFAR efforts. Diplomats
express increased access, influence, and greater opinion of US forces following
humanitarian assistance and partnership exercises.29 The PEPFAR program also
helps foster more robust military relationships. Ambassadors have noted that
GHE opened the door to military collaborations, fighting VEOs and a range
of other security issues.30 The program has advanced public diplomacy, opened
doors in difficult relationships, extended the reach of US embassies, and
leveraged domestic investment in health.31 All these benefits help prevent a
void where VEOs can find space to operate, flourish, and destabilize countries
and regions.

Chinese and Foreign Efforts
While GHE efforts have increased US standing on the world stage, China
is narrowing the gap. Over the last several years, worldwide US approval ratings
dropped from 48 percent to 31 percent, while China’s leadership rating by
contrast posted a slow steady gain from 31 percent to 34 percent.32 According
to a 2020 poll, China’s President Xi Jinping received higher confidence “to do
the right thing regarding international affairs” than the US president (19 percent
versus 16 percent).33 Further, African countries such as Nigeria and Tunisia had
a more favorable opinion of China. China continues to ignore global rules and
to maximize their advantage, a common practice of rising powers.34
Essential to this tactic is the stick-and-carrot approach. China’s biggest
stick is using their mammoth economy to browbeat trading partners into bilateral
trade agreements that benefit only China. This stick is coupled with debt-trap
financing to leverage favorable deals when overwhelmed countries default
on Chinese loans, all backed by an aggressive military that has deliberately
disregarded UN rulings. China continues to expand military colonization of
islands in the South China Sea years after the area was awarded to the Philippines

29. Gary Roughhead et al., US Navy Humanitarian Assistance in an Era of Austerity (Washington, DC:
CSIS, 2013), 2.
30. Tom Daschle and Bill Frist, Building Prosperity, Stability, and Security through Strategic Health
Diplomacy: A Study of 15 Years of PEPFAR (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2018),
26, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Building-Prosperity-Stabilityand-Security-Through-Strategic-Health-Diplomacy-A-Study-of-15-Years-of-PEPFAR.pdf.
31. Daschle and Frist, Building Prosperity, 26–27.
32. R. J. Reinhart and Zacc Ritter, “China’s Leadership Gains Global Admirers,” Gallup, March 4, 2019,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/247196/china-leadership-gains-global-admirers.aspx.
33. Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf, and Mara Mordecai, “US Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say
Country Has Handled Coronavirus Badly,” Pew Research Center, September 15, 2020, https://www.pewresearch
.org/global/2020/09/15/us-image-plummets-internationally-as-most-say-country-has-handled-coronavirus-badly/.
34. Robert Gilpin, “Hegemonic War and International Change,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on
Cause of War and Peace, 4th ed., comp. Richard K. Betts (Boston, MA: Pearson, 2013), 107.
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by the International Court at The Hague.35 Given the aforementioned coercive
and sharp tactics, it is easy to overlook China’s use of other diplomatic strategies
that have the People’s Republic of China gaining ground around the world.
There is a misperception that China does not understand the use of soft
power. Their abysmal human rights record at home and in Taiwan, coupled with
censorship of the Internet, conjure visions of soft-power inadequacies.36 Married
with China’s sharp/coercive power and its prolific gray zone strategies, these
themes paint a dark picture. China, however, is quite astute in the applications
of soft power, leveraging soft power tools like Panda diplomacy, stadium
diplomacy, and Confucius Institutes.37 Additionally, China is using their Belt
and Road Initiative, a massive infrastructure program connecting China to other
continents, to open the door for application of softer means across Asia, Africa,
and even into Europe.
China initiated GHE efforts in 1963, when they sent medical teams to
Algeria, building a hospital there. Since then, according to Peilong Liu, “about
23,000 Chinese medical workers have been sent to about 66 countries to provide
services to an estimated 270 million people. At the end of 2013, 1,171 Chinese
medical workers were working in 113 medical centers in 49 countries.”38 China
has complemented these efforts in the past decade with the christening of its first
hospital ship.
The Daishan Dao, also known as the Peace Ark, is China’s most tangible
and visible instrument of influence abroad through medical means. Built for
a mission set like the USNS Comfort or USNS Mercy, China’s hospital ship is
an unwavering exporter of Chinese soft power. On its initial tour, the ship
conducted a three-month operational cruise around the Horn of Africa; a decade
later this location is now the site of China’s first overseas base.39 Since 2008, the
Chinese ship and its team of medical professionals have provided medical care

35. Stephen Burgess, “Confronting China’s Maritime Expansion in the South China Sea: A Collective Action
Problem,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 3, no. 3 (August 31, 2020): 112–34; Sarah Zheng and Rachel Zhang,
“South China Sea: Calls to Honour Hague Ruling 5 Years On, but Beijing Digs In,” South China Morning Post,
July 25, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3142456/south-china-sea-calls-honour
-hague-ruling-5-years-beijing-digs.
36. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “China’s Soft Power Deficit: To Catch Up, Its Politics Must Unleash the Many Talents of
Its Civil Society,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2012, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230445110
4577389923098678842.
37. David Volodzko, “China’s Medical Diplomacy: China’s Latest Contribution to the WHO Is Part of a
Long History of Using Medical Diplomacy as Soft Power,” Diplomat, April 12, 2016, https://thediplomat
.com/2016/04/chinas-medical-diplomacy.
38. Peilong Liu et al., “Chinese Distinct Engagement in Global Health in Africa,” Lancet, August 30, 2014,
794, http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:399727/FULLTEXT02.
39. James A. Chambers, “The Rise of Chinese Military Medicine: Opportunity for Mercy Ship, Not
Gunboat, Diplomacy,” Military Medicine 176, no. 9 (September 2011): 1045, https://academic.oup.com/milmed
/article/176/9/1043/4345491.
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to 180,000 people across 40 countries.40 According to the People’s Republic of
China, the ship contains several operating rooms and can care for 1,000 patients
simultaneously. During a weeklong stop in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea,
in 2018 the ship’s staff cared for 4,000 patients.41 That same operational tour,
titled “Mission Harmony,” included 10 other country stops, many throughout
the eastern Pacific and western hemisphere, including Venezuela.42
During past partnership exercises, such as Pacific Rim, US and Chinese
medical personnel worked together. These exchanges have helped craft Chinese
policy changes on how to employ or staff the hospital ship, which is a win when
viewed through a humanitarian lens.43 This collaboration establishes common
ground for cooperation in high-stakes humanitarian relief or disaster relief
operations. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is “gearing up the transformation
from a green-water navy to a blue water force that does not just protect its own
sailors in naval combat but also saves the lives of those in need, regardless of
nationality.”44 With China’s shift from a regional power to a country with
worldwide reach and ambitions, the Peace Ark will undoubtedly play a role in
those efforts.
In addition to the Peace Ark circumnavigating the globe, China has made
significant GHE contributions worldwide. The country contributed to Haiti
earthquake relief in 2010. More recently, China played a significant role on
the world stage during the Ebola endemic in West Africa.45 China has had a
significant medical presence across Africa since first aiding Algeria during
their war for independence in 1963. In 2015, they committed “to send 1,500
medical professionals to the continent.”46 Since 1963, they have deployed 18,000
medical professionals to 46 countries.47 It is clear China is well versed in using
GHE and continues to leverage this strategy to shape the operating environment
to its benefit.
A recent high-profile example of China using GHE to alter a country’s
ill-perception of them involved the shipment of face masks to Canada during
the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the whole world was in need,
40. Associated Press (AP), “Chinese Hospital Ship Stops in Turbulent Venezuela,” Navy Times, September, 22, 2018,
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2018/09/22/chinese-hospital-ship-stops-in-turbulent-venezuela/.
41. People’s Republic of China (PRC), official website, accessed August 9, 2019, https://eng.mod.gov.cn
/news/2019-04/23/content_4840098.html.
42. AP, “Chinese Hospital Ship.”
43. Da-Wei Li et al., “Inspiration of the Functional Localization of a US Naval Hospital Ship on a Chinese
Hospital Ship,” Military Medicine Research 3, no. 7 (April 2016).
44. PRC, official website, accessed August 9, 2019, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-04/23/content
_4840098.html.
45. Michaud et al., “Militaries and Global Health,” 281.
46. Volodzko, “China’s Medical Diplomacy.”
47. Lloyd Thrall, China’s Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2015), 49, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR905.html.
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Canada was in the midst of selecting a company to install 5G networks across their
country. Huawei, China’s state-sponsored telecom giant with ties to the Chinese
Communist Party, was a contender, however, fears of privacy violations and spying
were a major concern. The face masks were designed to increase the favorable
perception of Huawei and potentially get them beneficial action regarding their
bid.48 Similarly, China shipped supplies to European countries like Serbia and
Spain. These actions helped China reinforce the narrative that the United States
abandoned these countries, that China can fulfill the role of leader on the world
stage, and that China is taking COVID-19 seriously.49
Due to their participation in high-visibility medical missions and international
cooperation activities, it comes as no surprise that China enjoys a positive reputation
across Africa. A recent Pew Research poll explored over 24 countries’ views of China,
including three Africa countries. Kenya and Nigeria expressed a 67 percent and
61 percent positive rating of China, respectively. South African opinion was supportive
as well, with 49 percent favorable and 38 percent unfavorable.50 China’s medical
diplomacy will continue to help the country make inroads across the entire southern
hemisphere, especially in Africa.

Recommendations and Challenges
Several recommendations for improvement, many with a foundation or
framework already in place, bear consideration. Some proposals are best practices and
whole-of-government approaches that can be replicated across other combatant
commands. Leveraging existing organizations with expertise, resourcing those entities,
and investing early in cross-domain training for company-grade officers can pay
long-term dividends. First, there is a distinct need for greater synchronization of
efforts across the interagency and others to realize the full potential of GHE. There
has been little coordination in the past when synchronizing military and civilian
NGO efforts. Navy hospital ships have arrived in ports without advance planning
or communication with the NGO already on the ground.51 Coordinating across
all instruments of national power is imperative to maximize effectiveness and
achieve synergy.
Given the previously mentioned concerns regarding unity of effort, all combatant
commands should endeavor to provide synchronization, as the AFRICOM
48. Alicia Chen and Vanessa Molter, “Mask Diplomacy: Chinese Narratives in the COVID Era,” Freemen
Spogli Institute for International Studies (blog), Stanford University, June 16, 2020, https://fsi.stanford.edu
/news/covid-mask-diplomacy.
49. Brian Wong, “China’s Mask Diplomacy: By Shipping Medical Supplies to European Countries, China Is
Seeking to Boost Its Image as a Responsible Global Leader,” Diplomat, March 25, 2020, https://thediplomat
.com/2020/03/chinas-mask-diplomacy/.
50. Richard Wike et al., “International Publics Divided on China,” Pew Research Center, October 1, 2018,
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/international-publics-divided-on-china.
51. Roughhead, US Navy Humanitarian Assistance, 3.
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model does, through liaisons with other governmental agencies. US AFRICOM
has embedded more than 30 personnel from a variety of other US government
agencies, including personnel from USAID.52 USAID is a key partner in delivering
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and the training and provision of
host-nation medical facilities. Furthermore, the AFRICOM leadership team
includes a deputy commander for civil-military engagement and a senior Foreign
Service officer from the US Department of State. This integration enables a
whole-of-government approach and maximizes preexisting on-the-ground resources,
whether other governmental agencies or supporting long-term NGOs partners.
The framework to do so already tenuously exists.
The Department of Defense should leverage under-resourced tools already
in place to help synchronize efforts. The “Uniformed Services University
Health Sciences (USU) is the nation’s federal health professions academy,”
which should be doing more than just training doctors, nurses, and future
scientists.53 The university’s Center for Global Health Engagement was
established to provide support to the combatant commands.54 With the
alignment of the Defense Health Agency and Uniformed Services University
as a direct-report unit, the Defense Health Agency should be resourced to
synchronize efforts and act as a repository for GHE best practices across
combatant commands.
Second, GHE is a wide-reaching effort that affects not just the military
and needs the incorporation of interagency, NGOs, and other governmental
agency partners. Midgrade officers should receive yearlong assignments to
organizations such as the Department of State or USAID to gain interagency
experience.55 The Army Medical Department already affords similar opportunities
through “Training with Industry,” where select personnel spend a year with the
Joint Commission (responsible for health-care facility accreditation) and RAND,
among others.56 These officers then return to the Army Medical Department
and infuse it with fresh ideas. Further, the connections made with civilian
counterparts in these agencies can lead to career-long relationships that facilitate
cross-organization collaboration.

52. “About the Command,” United States Africa Command, accessed August 19, 2019, https://www.africom
.mil/about-the-command.
53. “About,” Uniformed Services University (USU), accessed August 26, 2019, https://www.usuhs.edu/about.
54. “Overview,” USU Center for Global Health Engagement, USU, accessed August 8, 2021, https://cghe
.usuhs.edu/home.
55. J. Christopher Daniel and Kathleen H. Hicks, Global Health Engagement: Sharpening a Key Tool for
the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2014), 12, https://www.csis.org/analysis/global
-health-engagement.
56. “AAC Training with Industry,” US Army Acquisition Support Center (blog), accessed August 9, 2021,
https://asc.army.mil/web/career-development/programs/aac-training-with-industry/.

76

Parameters 51(3) Autumn 2021

Third, the United States can continue to project and brand American
global goodwill by leveraging high-visibility entities already performing on
the world stage. The USNS Mercy, stationed in San Diego with ready access
to the Naval Medical Center San Diego, should be a keystone component in
partnership enhancement. With one third of Indo-Pacific Command’s vast area
of responsibility composed of island nations, a hospital ship can expand global
influence and help brand American diplomacy across half the earth’s surface.57
Concurrently, the USNS Comfort, stationed on the east coast and colocated with the
Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, is a prime candidate to bring medical training
and assistance to Africa, something the Chinese have been doingfor half a century.
Medical SMEEs with NATO countries on the European continent will help reinforce
commitments to alliance partners staring down the barrel of overt Russian aggression.
Finally, abundant information on the statistical impact of global health
engagement is available. Initiatives that show results get funded. In an era of
constrained resources, it is incumbent upon the services providing GHE to show
the combatant commanders a return on investment. While subjective and anecdotal
evidence can demonstrate the great impact of this engagement, quantitative changes
in local perceptions would further support the need to continue or expand the
program. Quantitative analysis should start with pre- and post-questionnaires of
the local populace and foreign military medical personnel participating in
MEDCAPs and SMEEs. A survey created for a 2020 engagement in Senegal,
designed in English and translated into French, to receive frank quantitative
feedback, was not fielded due to the cancellation of the exercise. Adding tools
like this survey and leveraging processes and organizations already in existence
can help multiply the impact of American global health efforts.
Challenges for limited resources and the global pandemic will continue to
impact overseas engagements. The COVID-19 crisis phase and stateside response
necessitated the cancellation of three scheduled African GHEs in summer 2020.
As US response operations stabilized, and the organization reviewed the ability
to put together a single exercise, unknowns and quarantine restrictions hampered
the ability to gather a full team. During planning, a paucity of valid statistics on
COVID-19 prevalence rates in a given country, changes of embassy staff, and
sealing of national borders complicated issues. Further, there were cultural
questions about whether US personnel bringing in their personal medical
protective equipment would be perceived as favorable and considerate or
whether it would sow distrust.58 Finally, the time required to remove a critical
clinician from soldier-focused care, such as an orthopedic surgeon (two weeks
57. “About USINDOPACOM,” US Indo-Pacific Command, accessed August 15, 2019, https://www.pacom
.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/.
58. Author’s personal experience, April–May 2020.

Soft Power and Military Aid

Wissemann

77

stateside quarantine, three weeks in country, two weeks quarantine upon
return) is untenable given the surgical caseload of musculoskeletal injuries the
active-duty population sustains. Some of these concerns can be mitigated by
utilizing fully vaccinated medical professionals. If GHE is to continue, the
remainder of these issues will need to be addressed early in planning through
requests for information and leveraging previously established relationships on
the ground.

Conclusion
While global health engagement and strategic health diplomacy are not
new concepts, they are still compelling tools for influencing behavior. The use of
global health engagement as an instrument of national power could provide the
catalyst for countries teetering between alliances to side with whoever can garner
favor with their population, achieving the ends of spreading democracy, values,
and influence worldwide.
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